CHAPTER VII.

OPERATIONS AGAINST CHARLESTON.

THE Navy Department, on June 26th, addressed a letter to Rear-Admiral Dupont, from which the following is an extract:

"To your ceaseless vigilance and that of the officers under your command we were indebted, some months since, for the destruction of the notorious steamer Nashville, which the enemy had armed and fruitlessly endeavored to send out to destroy our commerce; and now to your timely measures, and the efficient means provided, do we owe the capture of one of the most powerful ironclads afloat—a vessel prepared after months of toil and great expenditure of money, and sent forth with confidence to disperse our blockading fleet and overcome our monitors.

"You may well regard this, and we may with pleasure look upon it as a brilliant termination of a command gallantly commenced and conducted for nearly two years with industry, energy, and ability."

On the 21st of April the Assistant Secretary of the Navy said to Admiral Dahlgren, in the Navy Department, that it was his wish that he (Dahlgren) should relieve Dupont. Dahlgren says in relation to this:

If I am wanted there now, an order will soon take me there, as I am an applicant for sea service. Next day the President came into Fox's room while I was there, and sat some time, talking generally of matters. He said nothing of the Charleston business, in the way of opinion, but remarked that Dupont's last letter showed over-readi-

ness to think that his (the President's) letter censured him. Abe was in good humor, and at leaving said, "Well, I will go home; I had no business here; but as the lawyer said, I had none anywhere else."

May 28th.—Dupont is to be relieved, and three are spoken of in his place—Gregory, Foote, and myself. There is evidently an idea of two commanders, one for the fleet generally, and one for the attack, intended I think, to include Foote and myself (Dahlgren's Memoirs, p. 390).

Admiral Foote was taken suddenly ill, and that gallant officer died in New York on the 26th of June. Admiral Dahlgren was ordered to relieve Admiral Dupont, and left with the least possible delay; he arrived at Port Royal on the 4th of July. He says:

General Gillmore wished to act, and had called for assistance. Dupont had no specific instructions, but would assist. He preferred to await my arrival. A very loose state of things; no shape or connection. After Rodgers got to the Wabash a note was sent me from Dupont, saying he was 'rejoiced' and would send for me at 10. Dupont was very pleasant. The cabins full of officers.

In the afternoon I went over to Hilton Head to see General Gillmore. He said that his project must now be tried, or it would be too late in a few days. So I had no alternative but to grant the aid asked (Dahlgren's Memoirs, p. 396).

On the 5th Admiral Dahlgren met General Gillmore on board of the Wabash, and they "put the matter in a definite shape." The admiral "would send in five ironclads to clear the ground on Morris Island, and he would attempt an assault the night before. If it failed, then he would open the batteries. The thing is rather complicated, and, to make it worse, I am new to the squadron and the locality, and my staff likewise. . . . Besides, three of the turrets are being altered, and this work has to be stopped for the occasion" (Dahlgren's Memoirs, p. 397-8).

¹ This change in the turret fitments could only be effected by direct orders from the Navy Department, and yet Admiral Dupont was held derelict in not having

On the 6th the command of the squadron was turned over to Rear-Admiral Dahlgren. On the 7th he "received a note from General Gillmore, who asked to postpone one day. Agreed on."

In taking leave of Rear-Admiral Dupont, the writer is impelled to give a sketch of him, perhaps such as is in the memory of every officer who was personally acquainted with him or served near him. Professionally, he was thoroughly able; he possessed undaunted courage, energy, and zeal; his education was of a high order, and his character might well serve as a model in every respect. He had the rare ability to make the best use of the personnel and the material under his control, and to maintain over no less than forty harbors, inlets, and channel-ways, as rigorous a blockade as it was in the power of man to accomplish with the vessels which were at his disposal.

In appearance he was distinguished, over six feet in height, admirably proportioned, graceful and urbane, with an intelligent expression and action. It will not be considered adulatory to those who knew him to say that no officer in our navy within the past half century was gifted with a more distinguished appearance or exalted character.

On July 15th the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Rear-Admiral Dupont, after the close of his official duties, as follows: "Elsewhere, and in public official communications, I have expressed my high appreciation of your services and of the ability you have exhibited."

the monitors within Charleston bar, and for failing to give co-operation to General Gillmore, who writes on June 30th: "My preparations are nearly completed, but I can do nothing until Admiral Dupont's successor arrives and gets ready to work. The admiral has no instructions, and does not feel at liberty to put his vessels into action on the eve of relinquishing his command." General Gillmore, however, was not ready to operate until July 10th, or four days after Dahlgren was in command.

There was further correspondence between the Navy Department and the admiral of an acrimonious character, which neither the limits nor the objects of this volume could take in. A careful consideration of what is herein presented, will show, however, that certain charges of disobedience of orders were simply technical, namely: the ironclads should have been within Charleston bar, as per order, when they were undergoing repairs from injuries received, and were having base-rings put around their turrets, and pilot-houses increased in thickness, by order of the Department, which could not have been done off Charleston; also, a failure to cooperate with General Gillmore as ordered, when Gillmore was not ready to operate until some days after Dahlgren took command.

Admiral Dahlgren, when in an inferior grade, had with great difficulty introduced into the naval service an improved armament of shell guns and boat howitzers, in relation to which Rear-Admiral Dupont, immediately after the battle of Port Royal, wrote him as follows:

But besides this, I am impelled by a feeling of duty to address you. The large ordnance of this squadron has sprung from your inventive genius, and thankful am I, for one, for those long years of study, scientific research, and deductions, which so materially aided in arming the American navy as I believe no other navy is armed. . . . I only now wish you could have seen the practice from this ship during the engagement, not alone for its precision and destructive results, but for the rapidity with which such large guns could be loaded with their heavy shell.

I never get transporté, as the French term it, about such things, but I will repeat, to the day of my death, that the second assault of this ship upon the forts, for rapidity, continuity, and precision of fire, has never been surpassed in naval warfare.

Although irrelevant, the above is introduced as information valuable in itself, and pertinent to show personal relations and official appreciation.

Admiral Dahlgren, upon assuming command, had shown him by Dupont a letter from Gillmore, to the effect that he was about operating on Morris Island, and asked naval cooperation. This had been declined in order to enable his successor to make all preliminary arrangements.

"General Gillmore had informed him [Dahlgren] that the enemy appeared to be aware of his design, and was working on Morris Island with great activity to defeat it, and would succeed unless speedy action was taken. There being no time to ascertain the views of the Department it only remained for him to furnish the assistance required."

This he proposed to do with the monitors, with what assistance from the wooden vessels was found practicable. He regretted the probability that at the time desired the Ironsides would not be able to cross the bar. He says: "Of course, the most that is expected from the action of these vessels is to relieve the troops as much as possible, and is to be considered of no other consequence."

On the 10th of July General Gillmore opened his batteries, situated on the north end of Folly Island, against those of the enemy occupying the southern sand-hills of Morris Island.

At 4 A.M. the Catskill, Commander George W. Rodgers, the Montauk, Commander D. M. Fairfax, the Nahant, Commander John Downes, and the Weehawken, Commander E. R. Colhoun, passed the bar, the admiral's flag being on board of the leading vessel. General Gillmore opened fire about this time, and as soon as sufficiently near, the monitors opened fire with shell upon the enemy's batteries, which were replying to those of General Gillmore. The fire of the monitors dispersed the enemy wherever seen to assemble. About eight o'clock the land batteries ceased firing and the troops in some force were seen making their way along the beach on Morris Island.

The monitors, with the advance of the troops, now moved parallel to the low, flat ground that extends northward between the sand-hills and Fort Wagner, as near to the island as the depth of water permitted, rolling shells over the surface to clear away any bodies of troops that might be behind a continuous sand-ridge near the beach.

Two or three buildings near Fort Wagner were set on fire by the enemy, for the supposed purpose of unmasking the guns of the fort looking down the beach. The monitors were now laid abreast of Fort Wagner, which is situated about 23 miles from the southern end of Morris Island, and 13 mile north of the sand-hills situated on that end. number of guns in Wagner was supposed to be ten or At 9.30 the monitors opened on the work. The admiral desired to get within grape-shot range, but was not able to get closer than about 1,200 yards, by reason of shoal water. The fire was promptly and vigorously returned till noon, when the monitors dropped down to allow the men to have dinner, after which they re-occupied their position and continued firing until 6 P.M., and then withdrew, the men having been fourteen hours employed. The weather was excessively hot. Five hundred and thirty-four shell and shrapnel were fired during the day, and from the different points of view the practice appeared to be excellent.

The admiral was favorably impressed with the endurance of the monitors. The Catskill was struck sixty times, a large percentage of the hits being very severe. The pilothouse, turret, and side armor, were all more or less damaged. Some of the shots were large; one found on deck after striking the turret proved to be a X-inch; when these heavy shot struck, the concussion was very great. An officer touching the turret at such a time was knocked down senseless and much injured. The iron of the pilot-house was

broken through entirely, and a nut from one of the bolts driven against the lining, so as to break it through. The deck-plates were also cut through in many places, so as to make the entrance of water troublesome. The test was most severe, as all admitted who saw the vessel. Yet after firing one hundred and twenty-eight rounds she came out of action in good working order, as was proven by her going into action the next day.¹

The enemy directed his fire almost exclusively against the Catskill. The Nahant was hit six times, the Montauk twice, and the Weehawken was untouched.

The following morning the admiral received a note from General Gillmore stating that at early daylight he had made an assault on Wagner and had been repulsed. He had learned that the enemy expected reinforcements at 10 A.M., and asked for action to prevent it. In accordance with the request, four monitors were again moved near Wagner, and scoured the ground in that vicinity.

On July 17th the admiral states that since his last report he had been occupied with measures to continue the advance and have the Ironsides with five monitors inside the bar. An attack was made on our forces in the Stono the previous day, which had been repulsed. The Pawnee had been struck forty-two times.

¹ The above is a transcript from the official report of the Admiral. It seems entirely admissible, in view of the facts presented to suppose that he was not very favorably impressed with the endurance of the monitors. Captain Rodgers reports "that the deck has been entirely broken through in four places, two of these sufficiently large to admit large quantities of water, requiring shot-plugs.

The hull was struck on the port quarter, completely shattering all the plates." Two engineers and several firemen were prostrated by the intense heat in the fire- and engine-room. The distance from the fort, it will be remembered, was given as 1,200 yards. Admiral Dahlgren's Memoirs, seen since writing the above, says, "her armor was very much hurt. The sides of the pilot-house bulged through, and I just escaped the end of a bolt that was dislodged."

On July 19th he states that the previous day a combined attack had been made by the troops under General Gillmore and the vessels under his command. At 11.30 A.M. the admiral led on board of the Montauk, Commander Fairfax, followed by the Ironsides, Captain S. C. Rowan; the Catskill, Commander G. W. Rodgers; the Nantucket, Commander Beaumont; the Weehawken, Commander Colhoun; and the Patapsco, Lieutenant-Commander Badger. At 12.30 the Montauk anchored abreast of Fort Wagner and fired the first gun, the other vessels following. The tide ebbing, the pilot The distance to the fort was was averse to going nearer. The gunboats Paul Jones, about twelve hundred yards. Commander A. C. Rhind; Ottawa, Lieutenant-Commander W. D. Whiting; Seneca, Lieutenant-Commander Wm. Gibson; Chippewa, Lieutenant-Commander T. C. Harris; and Wissahickon, Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Davis, at the same time were using their pivot guns against the fort at long range, and the batteries of General Gillmore, about one thousand yards south, on Morris Island, were firing very deliberately and steadily.

At 4 r.m., with a flood-tide, weighed anchor and closed in to within about three hundred yards of the fort, so that for the day not a shot was fired afterward at the vessels, nor was a man to be seen about it. Near sunset a note was received from General Gillmore stating that he had ordered an assault, and the battalions could be seen advancing along the beach. "Before our troops had reached the works it became too dark to discern them. To this moment an incessant and accurate fire had been maintained by the vessels; but now it was impossible to distinguish whether it took effect on friend or foe, and, of necessity, it was suspended. Very soon afterward the rattle of musketry and the flashes of light artillery announced that our men were mounting to

the attack. This continued without intermission until 9.30 p.m., then gradually decreased and died away altogether.

"The ill-tidings of a repulse were not long coming; the admiral was of opinion that the number of troops was inadequate. The officers and men were zealous, and labored hard; the general plans were well conceived; but there was a manifest lack of force."

The following morning the admiral sent a flag of truce on shore to offer to take charge of our wounded. The offer was rejected, and the fact observed that dead and wounded were lying about the ground. The enemy stated that the dead would be buried and the wounded properly provided for. Owing to our wounded lying exposed, it was not possible to do anything that day; the vessels were ordered to withdraw in order that the men might get fresh air below. The admiral expresses his satisfaction with those under his command, and says the vessels were handled with great skill in the narrow channel.

On July 21st he forwards copies of correspondence between General Gillmore and himself, and states his belief that an additional land force is absolutely required to advance operations. "Fort Wagner had been silenced and its garrison driven to shelter, and that could be repeated; the rest could only be accomplished by troops."

As a part of the operations against Charleston, the command of General A. H. Terry was sent up the Stono River to make a diversion. The Pawnee, Commander G. B. Balch; the McDonough, Lieutenant-Commanding Bacon; and the Marblehead, Lieutenant-Commanding Scott, were in those waters to co-operate.

On the afternoon of July 9th the Pawnee, Nantucket (monitor), the McDonough, and the Williams proceeded up the Stono, anchored above Strom's Landing, and opened

fire on James Island. The troops followed in transports, landed, and sent a force out on the island. On the 11th a Confederate battery opened fire on the army transport Hunter, and at once received the fire of the McDonough and the Williams. In the afternoon, at the request of General Terry, the Pawnee anchored off Grimball's, near the locality where the Isaac Smith had been captured five months previously, and opened fire in the direction of Secessionville, to assist our troops in making a forward movement, and this was continued, and at ranges designated, until signal was made to cease, when the troops advanced.

On the morning of the 16th the enemy opened a heavy fire on the Pawnee and Marblehead, choosing a time when the position of the vessels would not permit their batteries to bear. The narrow channel, and the steering-wheel of the Pawnee being disabled, made the attempt to drop down perilous, but the movement was effected without grounding, and was most opportune. General Terry signalled that the enemy was advancing in force, and requested the Pawnee to open fire. This was effectively done, and an advance along a causeway was checked. The attack on Terry's troops was very spirited, and, as learned through prisoners taken, the design was to disable the vessels, and by means of a superior force capture the troops.

On the afternoon of that day General Terry stated that he had fulfilled his instructions, and would embark during the night. As proposed, the troops left, and the vessels of war dropped down to the inlet.

Active operations, from causes indicated above, were suspended on Morris Island until the morning of August 17th, at which time General Gillmore opened fire on Fort Sumter from all of his batteries. At the same time Admiral Dahlgren, with his flag on board of the Weehawken,

followed by the Catskill, Nahant, and Montauk, attacked Wagner, the New Ironsides taking position in face of the fort. From outside the bar the Canandaigua, Mahaska, Cimarrone, Ottawa, Wissahickon, Dai Ching, and Lodona opened also with rifles and pivot guns.

As the tide rose the monitors closed to within a distance of about four hundred and fifty yards of Wagner, and the Ironsides as near as her draught would permit. After a couple of hours the fort was silenced, and the fire of the vessels was less frequent thereafter. During the action Fort Moultrie made fair practice on the Ironsides.

The batteries of General Gillmore were working effectively on the gorge of Sumter. Later in the day the admiral shifted his flag to the Passaic, and, accompanied by the Patapsco, steamed to within two thousand yards of Sumter, and opened fire on its southeast face with one rifled 150-pounder on board of each of these vessels. Sumter scarcely replied, Wagner was silent, and battery Gregg alone, on Cummings Point, maintained a deliberate fire at the two monitors. The vessels were withdrawn at noon, the batteries of General Gillmore continuing an effective fire at Sumter. In the afternoon the Passaic and Patapsco again attacked Wagner to prevent repairs. The fort opened briskly on them, but in a short time remained silent.

During this day's bombardment a heavy shot striking the top of the pilot-house of the Catskill, of which vessel Commander George W. Rodgers was in temporary command, caused the instant death of that gallant officer and of Paymaster Woodbury, who was at his side. The fragments of iron also wounded Mr. Penton, the pilot, and Master's Mate Wescott.

Commander Rodgers was the chief-of-staff to the admiral, but on this occasion had been permitted to take the Catskill into action. The vessel withdrew temporarily, the bodies were transferred to a tug, and the Catskill resumed her position at 11 A.M. In relation to the death of his chief-of-staff the admiral in his official report says: "It is but natural that I should feel deeply the loss thus sustained, for the close and confidential relation which the duties of the fleet-captain necessarily occasion, impressed me deeply with the loss of Captain Rodgers. Brave, intelligent, and highly capable, devoted to his duty and to the flag under which he passed his life, the country cannot afford to lose such men. Of a kind and generous nature, he was prompt to give relief when he could."

The writer cannot refrain from adding that from the time of separation on leaving the Naval School, he never met his classmate Rodgers without an increased appreciation of his great professional aptitude. He possessed, in a marked degree, all of the high qualities assigned him by the admiral. Eminently useful in all the subordinate grades, had he lived, he would have become a distinguished officer of the highest rank.

After this day's bombardment, by land batteries and vessels, General Ripley, in command of Confederate defences, reports, "Sumter in ruins and all guns on northwest face disabled, besides seven other guns."

On the night of the 21st a "steam torpedo boat" came out of Charleston, and struck the Ironsides. A direct collision was not effected and the electric current failed also. The boat, however, effected her retreat under a heavy fire from the Ironsides and other vessels.

On the 23d of August, before daylight, five monitors were brought within about 800 yards of Sumter and opened fire. Considerable damage was done to the southeast and northeast faces. The fort replied with only six shots, but Moultrie,

with its extended line of earthworks, opened fire with many large guns and struck the monitors frequently with heavy shot. The Weehawken, upon which the admiral was, received two blows on the pilot-house "more forcible than any he had seen." Notwithstanding the difficulties of manœuvring during the night, and in a channel edged with shoals, only one monitor got aground. At six it was blowing from the southeast and the vessels were withdrawn. The Department was informed that the gorge of Sumter was completely ruined by the severe fire of the batteries of General Gillmore, aided by four rifled cannon of the navy in battery on shore under Commander F. A. Parker. The intention was expressed of "passing Sumter into the harbor if the obstacles are not of such a nature as to prevent it, as soon as the weather moderated."

On the 25th of August an exchange of prisoners took place by agreement. It was either happily arranged or fortuitous for the defenders of Fort Wagner. General Ripley says: "The enemy opened about daylight both from the fleet and land batteries. Wagner was sorely pressed, and the flag of truce boat was literally a godsend. The firing continued until 10 A.M., and for a portion of the time was equal in intensity to the bombardment of the 18th. One of the more advanced land batteries of Parrott guns did serious damage; the remaining X-inch columbiad on the sea-face was dismounted, and the magazines so much exposed that it became necessary to remove the ammunition. The commanding officer, anticipating a renewal of the bombardment upon the completion of the exchange of prisoners, requested that all necessary arrangements should be made for the transfer of the troops from the island in case of necessity. Four hours were consumed in effecting the delivery of 105 wounded prisoners and in receiving 39. The bombardment was not renewed, and the time thus allowed was improved to the utmost in repairing the damage that had been done." The casualties in the fort from the 20th to the 31st were 13 killed and 49 wounded.

The admiral states that at his request, on the 21st of September, General Gillmore had knocked down four or five pieces of ordnance that had been seen on the inner fronts of Sumter. Soon after midnight on the 2d he led in the Weehawken and anchored 600 yards from Sumter off the angle between the northeast and southeast fronts. The fire was maintained by all of the monitors, and the Ironsides, within good range, joined in the action. Moultrie opened a rapid and sustained fire from its extended line, which told with effect, notwithstanding the obscurity of the night, which interfered with accuracy of aim. The fire of the monitors was in some degree directed at the floating obstructions that had been reported from day to day. The vessels were engaged for five hours and fired 245 shots and received 7 hits.

A round shot which struck the base of the Weehawken's turret drove in a fragment of iron and broke the leg of Fleet-Captain Badger. "He had been with the admiral for eight years, and was one of the best ordnance officers in the navy. The loss of his services was felt greatly."

The enemy evacuated Morris Island on the night preceding the 7th of September. The previous day a steady cannonade had been maintained against Wagner from the land batteries and by the Ironsides, and it was known to the enemy that an assault was intended soon, which in fact was to have been carried out at 9 A.M. At this time General Gillmore's advanced sap was within forty yards of the salient. The army occupied Wagner and Gregg on the morning of the 7th.

From August 17th, the time the land batteries opened on

Fort Sumter from beyond Wagner, having a mean range of four thousand five hundred yards, every day brought ruin, until Sumter had not a single gun mounted. General Ripley's report of August 21st says: "Enemy opened heavily from land batteries on Morris Island on eastern face of Sumter. Four hundred and sixty-five projectiles struck outside, 259 inside, and 219 passed over. The eastern face was heavily battered and 2 barbette guns dismounted." During the night artillery implements, subsistence, and other stores and 9,700 pounds of powder were removed. This removal of stores, etc., was continued steadily, as opportunities favored. The next day all of the barbette guns were disabled except one XIinch and one X-inch on eastern face. The arches of the northwest face were demolished, of which five and the terreplein fell in. On the 23d the ironclads came up and engaged Twenty-nine projectiles struck Sumter at short distance. outside, 15 inside, and 17 missed. Considerable damage was done to the parapet and wall. From the land batteries came 282 projectiles outside, 310 inside, and 141 missed. The X-inch gun en barbette was disabled, and three 42pounder rifles in the northeast salient of second tier. Confederates were engaged in throwing the dismounted guns off the parapets and transporting them and munitions as they best could. Although the bombardment was almost daily, it is passed over here until the 30th. Four guns were then firing from the land batteries, and disabled three X-inch Columbiads that had been repaired. Three of the casemate arches on the northeast face were demolished, and two breaches made in the scarp wall, exposing the sand with which the arches were filled. September 1st, all of the guns en barbette were disabled, and the entire terreplein of the northeast face, with the exception of two arches, fell in. September 2d, "the Ironsides and monitors came up and directed their fire principally against Sumter, apparently with the intention of doing as much damage as possible. Nearly the whole of the eastern scarp was demolished. The accumulated debris served to protect the walls." Confederate reports show the steady destruction of Sumter and its armament, with little loss of life, until the evacuation of Morris Island, when its appearance from seaward was rather that of a steep, sandy island than of a fort.

On September 5th, General Ripley wrote a confidential letter to the officer commanding Fort Wagner, stating that it was "within the contingencies" that those works would be evacuated. He alluded to the fact that at different times they had been supplied with safety-fuse. "This would be examined and kept in place, and magazines would be prepared for explosion before the evacuation takes place, by causing safety-fuses, three in number, to be inserted in a barrel of gunpowder in each magazine and carefully trained, so that the explosion may not be premature." instructions follow; but they were carried out so indifferently as to be inoperative when the fort was evacuated. The commanding officer of the fort reported on the 6th that "thirty-six hours' severe bombardment, confining the garrison to the bombproofs, had so dispirited the garrison as to render it unsafe, in the opinion of its officers, to repel an as-The head of the enemy's sap was within forty yards of the salient, and he was making rapid progress, unmolested by a single gun, and with scarcely any annoyance from sharp-In an effort the previous night to repair damages a loss was sustained of from 60 to 80 men in the working parties alone. Without having the ability to repair damages at night, from the effects of the fire of the shore batteries and the fleet, the work would be rendered untenable in two days."

The garrison of Fort Wagner was successfully withdrawn without loss, except some 40 prisoners, and later, the failure to blow up the magazines was sharply commented upon by General Beauregard. With so many men in the trenches, close to the work, an explosion would have resulted in great loss of life.

The day following the evacuation of Morris Island Admiral Dahlgren sent a demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter, and was informed that "he could have Sumter when he could take and hold it."

The Weehawken was ordered on the night of the 7th to pass into a narrow, shoal, and tortuous channel between Sumter and Cummings Point, and in the attempt grounded and remained so for two tides. When her condition became known, Moultrie and other batteries on Sullivan's Island opened fire on her, as well as Fort Simkins on James Island. In returning the fire the Weehawken caused an explosion at Moultrie. One of her heavy shells struck and disabled an 8-inch columbiad, and glancing, fired a service magazine, killing 16 and wounding 12 men. Whilst aground she fired 36 shells at Moultrie and Bee and 46 at Sumter. She was struck 24 times, without material damage, and had 3 men wounded. The admiral, on board the Ironsides, and followed by the monitors, had moved up "to feel, and if possible, pass the obstructions north of Sumter." This force received a severe fire from the usual batteries, which was returned until it was thought best to give entire attention to the Weehawken. She was finally got affoat. In this affair Captain Rowan, in the Ironsides, did admirable service; one of the heaviest guns of the enemy was dismounted, and his fire, if not controlled, was much weakened. When only thirty shells remained, the anchor was weighed, firing kept up from all of the available guns, and she left unmolested, "after one of the severest artillery duels ever sustained by a ship" through a period of nearly three hours. Her armor was battered, but stood the battering fairly, quite disproving Mr. Stimer's assertion, previously noticed, of the superiority of five 1-inch plates over a solid plate of $4\frac{1}{4}$ inches in thickness.

On the night of September 8th an attempt to take Sumter by a boat expedition from the squadron resulted disastrously, not in great loss of life, but in the capture of a considerable number of officers and sailors, as well as the loss of several boats. The demand for the surrender of Sumter had informed the enemy, and boats in tow of tugs from the vessels outside of the bar during the whole of the afternoon left little doubt as to an intended attempt. He did not fail, therefore, to put a considerable force into Sumter for the occasion.

Commander T. H. Stevens was in command, and Lieutenant-Commander E. P. Williams, Lieutenants Remey, Preston, Higginson, and Ensign Craven, commanded the five divisions of boats. A detachment of marines, under Captain McCawley, formed also a part of the force, numbering in all 400. A request for the loan of some army boats brought the information that General Gillmore also intended making an attack. It was about 10 r.m. before the boats, in tow of a tug, reached the vicinity of Sumter; "a sound of musketry, followed by shells from the adjacent forts, announced the assault." Before the Admiral reached the vicinity the conflict had ceased. Of the 400, 10 officers and 104 men were taken prisoners, and 3 were reported killed.


Commander Stevens reported that on his way up he had communicated with the monitors Lehigh and Montauk and given orders to move up for his support. When within 800 yards of the fort, the boats cast off from the tug, and final instructions and the watch-word were given. Lieutenant Higginson's division was directed to move up to the

northwest front for the purpose of making a diversion, and the other divisions were ordered to close up and wait to advance on the southeast front. It was intended to wait until the full benefit of the diversion was attained, "but mistaking his movement, doubtless, as intended for a general one, and in that spirit of gallantry and emulation which characterizes the service, many of the other boats dashed on. Finding it too late to restrain them, the order was given to advance."

The boats, on approaching the fort, were met with a fire of musketry, hand-grenades, lighted shells, and grape and canister, and simultaneously, at a signal from the fort, all of the enemy's batteries, with one of their gunboats and rams, opened fire.

Several of the boats effected a landing, "but the evidences of preparation were so apparent, and the impossibility of effecting a general landing or scaling the walls so certain, that orders were given to withdraw." All who landed were either killed or taken prisoners. They were, in fact, entirely helpless, and when they agreed to surrender were taken around to another face, and helped to get within the fort.

There was a period of comparative quiet until the 5th of October, when a second attempt was made to blow up the Ironsides by a torpedo boat. At 9.15 p.m. a small object was seen by a sentinel and hailed. No answer was received and the sentry fired; the ship almost immediately thereafter received a very severe blow from an explosion which threw a column of water upon the spar deck and into the enginerom. The object was afterward known to be a torpedo boat, "shaped like a cigar, 50 feet long and 5 feet in diameter, and so submerged that the only portion visible was the coaming of her hatch, two feet above the water surface, and about 10 feet in length.



Sketch showing torpedo-boats as constructed at Charleston, S. C.

The boat was commanded by Lieutenant Glassell, formerly of the navy. He was taken prisoner, and stated that the explosion threw a column of water which put out the fires and left the boat without motive power.

The marine guard and musketeers on the spar-deck of the Ironsides saw a small object, at which a very severe fire was kept up until it drifted out of sight, when two of the monitors passed near; then it disappeared. Two boats were sent and made an unsuccessful search. The prisoner stated that he, Engineer Toombs, and a pilot, were compelled to abandon the vessel, and provided with life preservers, swam for their lives. Glassell hailed a coal schooner as he was drifting past, and was taken on board. Confederate reports say the boat and remainder of crew came back to Charleston.

The naval operations before Charleston were now only of blockade, and although the channel was certainly very limited the blockade-runners came and departed, but "the Navy Department was not informed of the fact." The monitors were being patched up where they had been battered, and were beached at high water and the sides were scraped at low water, and when afloat again, the flat floor was cleaned by divers. Their speed even then would not exceed four knots with all the revolutions their enginery could make.

On October 26th the army again opened on Sumter from the nearest attainable points on Morris Island, and were aided by the cross-fire of 150-pounder rifles on board of the Patapsco and Lehigh. This seemed wholly a work of supererogation, as Sumter was in appearance and in reality only a mass of ruins, without a gun mounted upon it.

¹ The Secretary of the Navy appeared before the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" and assumed that because "the Department was not informed of the fact" no vessels ran the blockade; actually twenty-one vessels ran in after the ruin of Sumter until the evacuation of Charleston.

On December 6th the monitor Weehawken sunk when made fast to one of the mooring buoys placed for those vessels within the Charleston bar. The previous day Commander Colhoun had been relieved by Commander Jesse Duncan, and a day or so before had taken on board as many heavy shells as the vessel would hold. The capacity of the shell-room of a monitor was found to be entirely insufficient for long continuous operations, hence the fore body was also allotted for their stowage. The hold was little deeper than sufficient to contain a XV-inch shell, below the "flying deck," which means one made of movable sections. The shells were thus conveniently stowed, and easily got up in action, and their weight not only made the monitors lie deep in the water, but also reduced the difference of draught between the bow and stern from a foot and a half to about six or eight inches, and this resulted in a sluggish water flow to the powerful pumps, which, placed aft, were ineffective. since the water could not reach them and hence could not be expelled.

When within Charleston bar, where the swell was often heavy, and usually sufficient to wash over the deck, in order to make the monitors habitable, or existence in them possible in hot weather, high coamings, or "hoppers" as they were called, were fitted around the hatch-openings.

The reader will remember that the "windlass-room" is a small apartment, previously described, in the bow of the monitors into which the anchor-chain is led through the hawse-hole from the "anchor-well." The plate over the latter forms a chamber, and serves as an air-cushion, in a measure preventing the entrance of water through the hawse-hole by slopping. Heavy plaits of strands of rope were made, known as gaskets, which were pliable, and in rough weather, whether at sea or at anchor, were, or should

have been, carefully mauled in from the windlass-room, around the chain, to fill the entire hawse-hole and thus prevent anything more than a seepage of water through it.

The morning was clear and pleasant; the high coaming at the windlass-room hatch served its purpose until the vessel had considerable water in her; only a little spray flew over it from time to time.

Near noon, a strong ebb-tide kept the broadside of the vessel to the sea; the hawse-pipe was not supplied with a "gasket," and a considerable amount of water slopped in, there being nothing to exclude it. The sea became heavier, the waves washing over the bow, and slopped over the hatchway in small quantities. To prevent water from getting into the cabin, the iron door between it and the windlass-room was closed; the seas increased, and while closing down the battle-plate of the hatch to the windlass-room, several seas went over, almost filling the room. The "limbers" were cleared and the executive officer had no fears that the water would not run aft and be pumped out; a small gutter, six by eight inches in dimensions, permitted a flow with whatever velocity the head would give it. The commanding officer had left the vessel soon after nine o'clock, and was on board the flag-ship near by until signal was made from the Weehawken that she was sinking. At about 1 P.M. Ensign Chadwick, observing that the water partially flooded the captain's cabin, called the assistance of Mr. Allen, the chief engineer, and they put on and secured the cross-bars to the iron door before mentioned. gradually rose in the windlass-room, as indicated by the leak about the door and in about thirty minutes it was on the top of the door" (Reports of Stuyvesant and Chadwick).

A court of inquiry found that the causes of the sinking of the Weehawken were: "The additional weight of ammunition that had been lately put on board of her, leaving her trim so little by the stern as not to afford sufficient inclination for water to get to the pumps freely.

"The neglect to close the hawse-hole, which permitted the rapid accumulation, at the forward extremity of the vessel, of sufficient water to bring her nearly on an even keel.

"The large amount of water that was permitted to come into the vessel under the turret, through the XI inch port, and down the berth-deck hatch, which assisted to tip the bows of the vessel.

"The amount of water which, owing to the immersion of the forward part of the vessel, came in under the plank sheer.

"The absence of all effort to relieve the forward part of the vessel from its depressed position by rolling shot aft, or moving any weight from the bow."

The reader is doubtless satisfied that the sinking of the vessel was clearly preventable up to within a few minutes of the occurrence. Had an apprehension of danger existed at the time the cabin door was securely bolted, it should have been thrown wide open instead; the hawse-hole should then have been filled in around the chain with a gasket, and such weights taken aft as would have been practicable, to increase the "trim by the stern" and the "water flow" to the pumps as much as possible. The fore body of the vessel gradually filled with water, which could not flow aft to the pumps, and it rose to the berth-deck floor.

Five minutes before the vessel went down the signal was made "Assistance required." At this moment no assistance could be rendered, save to rescue the crew from drowning. The vessel heeled over to the right, or, as seamen would say, "to starboard;" the bow settled, the water within rushed forward; for a minute, more or less, she lay

on her side, gradually settling, the water pouring in through the turret port, which was open, and through the main hatch, over the "hopper;" a dense steam arose out of the engineroom, the vessel assumed an upright position as she went down, and the top of the smoke-stack alone remained visible when the keel rested on the bottom. Four officers and twenty men were drowned, being below at the time, and unable to reach the deck through the inrush of the water, or, if on deck, unable to keep themselves afloat for the few minutes that intervened until boats were at hand for their rescue.

As the reader will have already observed, the Stono River was frequently a scene of contention between batteries and gunboats; again on Christmas day, at 6 A.M., we find an attack made on the Marblehead, Lieutenant-Commanding Meade. The vessel was at anchor near Legareville, and the batteries were on John's Island. The engagement lasted an hour and a half, with the loss of three killed and four wounded; the hull of the vessel was struck twenty times, and the rigging considerably damaged. Balch, in the Pawnee, lying further down, got under way, and from an enfilading position aided the Marblehead, and the mortar-schooner Williams, Acting-Master Freeman, having a fair wind, came up several miles and opened on the enemy, who abandoned two disabled guns, a dying man, intrenching tools, etc. The carriages were destroyed afterward, and two VIII-inch sea-coast howitzers were brought off by Meade.

Under instructions from the Department on January 28th, the admiral summarized the services of the ironclads under his command. He says: "The vessels thus shared fully with the army in the operation that led to the abandonment of the works on Morris Island, and besides what is already men-

tioned, prevented the access of reinforcements, or their accumulation between Wagner and Gregg. A detachment of seamen and marines, under Captain F. A. Parker, participated in the practice of the batteries at Fort Sumter, by working four navy rifle cannon landed for the purpose.

"The Ironsides is a fine powerful ship. Her armor has stood heavy battering very well, and her broadside of seven XI-inch guns and one VIII-inch rifle has always told with signal effect on the enemy.

"On the 19th of July, 1863, an English steamer attempted to pass into Charleston harbor, having eluded the outside blockade. The Catskill, Captain G. W. Rodgers, well up toward Moultrie, ran her on a shoal. Two or three other blockade-runners within the harbor afterward managed to escape, and one or two may have gotten in, but that ended the business of blockade-running at Charleston.

"On the morning of February 4, 1864, Bryson, in the monitor Lehigh, discovered a blockade-runner ashore on Sullivan's Island, outside of Moultrie. He opened fire at a distance of twenty-five hundred yards with an VIII-inch rifle and struck the vessel nine times in forty-two shots, and the following day used also a 12-pounder rifled howitzer. The first day the vessel was set on fire by the shells, but the flames apparently made little progress; on the second day she was again set on fire, and destroyed."

Early in February General Gillmore announced to the admiral his readiness to operate on the St. John's River, Florida, and desired a naval co-operation. This was at once given, the Mahaska, Dai Ching and Water Witch leaving forthwith. The force off Charleston was left in command of Commodore Rowan, and the admiral proceeded to Jacksonville. The National troops had landed at that point, and a considerable force gone into the interior. The admiral re-

turned to Charleston, leaving the Mahaska, Ottawa, and Norwich to second army operations.

The Confederates, notwithstanding repeated failures in the use of torpedo-boats off Charleston, had still sufficient encouragement to continue endeavors, which resulted on the night of February 19th in the destruction of the Housatonic, a fine vessel of war, lying outside the Charleston bar, some four miles from Moultrie.

About 9 P.M. an object was seen moving toward the ship, supposed one hundred yards distant; it had the appearance of a plank on the water; in two minutes it had reached the ship. Within this time the crew had been called to quarters, the chain cable slipped, and engine backed. The torpedoboat, for such she proved to be, struck the ship on the starboard side, forward of the mizzen-mast, and the Housatonic sunk almost immediately, the hammock nettings being just awash when the keel rested on the bottom. The crew ascended the rigging and were soon taken off by the boats from other vessels blockading. Ensign Hazeltine, and four of the crew were missing; they had been either stunned by the explosion or drowned as the vessel went down.

Pickering, who commanded the Housatonic, was severely bruised by the explosion. The torpedo-boat, which was designed to be wholly submerged if required, went down with the four men in her. She had on former occasions drowned her crews.

Notwithstanding the destruction of this torpedo-boat and her entire crew, another one, at 1 A.M. of March 6th, in North Edisto River, was discovered rapidly approaching the block-

¹ Had the vessel gone ahead instead of backing, when she slipped her cable, there is a reasonable probability that she would have escaped destruction.

ading steamer Memphis. The chain was slipped and the men called to quarters; the boat was then under the port quarter and no gun could be brought to bear on her; a rapid fire of small arms was delivered into what looked like a hatchway near her centre; she dropped a short distance astern, and came up again immediately under the stern. The propeller then revolving is supposed to have caught and broken the torpedo pole. The boat then appeared disabled and drifted up the river. An armed boat was sent to capture her, but the search was unsuccessful.

On the night of April 18th, the Wabash, lying off Charleston, was made the object of an unsuccessful attack. At 9.45 p.m. a boat was discovered on the starboard quarter, one hundred and fifty yards distant, moving up rapidly against the tide until abeam; then she turned and moved directly for the ship. The engines of the Wabash were started ahead, the chain slipped and the starboad battery and small arms opened fire upon the boat. Two round shot struck it, or near it when about forty yards distant from the vessel, and the boat was seen no more. The vessel cruised around the spot with men at the guns and marines ready with small arms, and signal was made to the blockading vessels of proximity of danger, but the boat was not seen by any of them.

The enemy not only used torpedo-boats with some success, but in the adjacent waters fixed torpedoes, which exploded on contact. By this means, in the St. John's River, fifteen miles above Jacksonville, on the 1st of April, the army transport Maple Leaf was sunk; and on the 10th of May, below the city, the transport Weed, and a third one later on. The navy steamer Harvest Moon, nearly one year later, was sunk in the same manner below Georgetown, and the Patapsco (monitor), particularly described hereafter, near Fort Sumter.

On May 23d, in an endeavor to aid army operations at Volusia, on the St. John's River, the tug Columbine, Ensign Sanborn, having an army detachment of 25 men on board, was fired upon, disabled, and run aground from the wheelropes having been cut by the shells, at Horse Shoe Landing, on her return from Volusia. Master's mate John Davis, "while nobly performing his duty," was killed; also 16 soldiers were killed or missing, and 5 wounded. The remainder were taken prisoners, and the vessel set on fire without removing the dead.

On June 3, 1864, the Water Witch, Commander Pendergrast, blockading in Ossabaw Sound, was boarded and captured, only one man (a "contraband") escaping. Seven cotton barges, carrying 150 men, approached the vessel, the night being dark and squally; they were, in fact, alongside almost as soon as discovered, and although boarding nettings were up, the vessel soon became a prize. The Water Witch lost 1 man killed, 13 wounded, and 2 missing. The Confederates lost their leader, Lieutenant Pelot of their navy, 8 or 10 killed, and 15 or 20 wounded.

Toward the middle of June Admiral Dahlgren received information from the Navy Department "that the enemy meditated a simultaneous movement on the blockade, inside and out, in order to cover the exit of a large quantity of cotton."

This led to some strategic movements on the part of the army along the Stono River, aided by a naval force in those waters. These operations were concluded on the 9th of July, after which General Foster returned to Port Royal. General Schimmelfennig, in command of the troops on James Island, in a letter to the admiral says: "I take pleasure in informing you of the excellent practice by your gunboats and monitors on Stono River yesterday. They drove the

enemy out of his rifle-pits, and prevented him from erecting an earthwork which he had commenced."

Commander G. M. Colvocoresses commanded the sailing sloop-of-war Saratoga, lying in Doboy Sound, Ga., blockading. He had received a copy of a newspaper published in Savannah, and observed that a county meeting had been called in his vicinity for the purpose of organizing a coast-guard.

As he regarded himself and those under his command as interested parties, he determined to attend, and for the purpose of holding a controlling majority, took with him 8 officers and 107 sailors and marines, supplied with bullets in lieu of ballots, leaving the vessel on the afternoon of the 2d of August. His party reached the mainland at 9 P.M., and the boats with their crews were sent back to the ship, to meet him the next day at the Ridge Landing, somewhat nearer the ship. A skirmish line was thrown out, and the advance begun. At midnight a house was reached, which was silently passed, and the main road toward Savannah was taken. Arriving at a bridge, the expedition was halted; an officer with seven men was detailed to guard it and to capture all persons coming from the direction of the McIntosh County Court House. At 11 A.M. on the following day the bridge was to be burned, which would prevent a possible attendance also of some three hundred Confederate cavalry supposed to be encamped some miles beyond.

The vicinity of the court house was reached, the party divided, Captain Colvocoresses taking half the force and Ensign Rogers the remainder, the one proceeding to the right, the other to the left. "When they arrived at the building they took to the neighboring woods, and lay there concealed until the proper time for making the attack. At 11 the sig-

nal was made, and the parties charged at double-quick, and completely surrounded the meeting, only three persons escaping." The officer left at the bridge burned it, and soon after came up, with eleven prisoners and a number of horses and buggies.

The captain then explained his designs to the persons who were found at the county meeting, placed them between lines of sailors and took up a line of march for the Ridge landing. As they proceeded, the party was augmented by three others, who had been somewhat tardy in leaving home. Another bridge was passed over, and set on fire. A large encampment near the road, which was to have been occupied by a force under organization for coast defence, was also burned. The expedition reached the point of embarkation at sunset, with twenty-six prisoners and twenty-two horses. It was ascertained that several of the prisoners held important county offices. It is not stated whether he took them and the horses on board, or paroled them. The attendance of Captain Colvocoresses was certainly quite a surprise, and was doubtless regarded as an unwarranted interference.

On a subsequent occasion Colvocoresses made another descent in the same vicinity, and captured a lieutenant and 28 cavalry, with their arms and equipments, and burned their encampment. He also destroyed two large salt works, and a bridge on the main road to Savannah.

Returning to Charleston we find the monitor Patapsco destroyed a sloop on shore near Moultrie, setting her on fire on the morning of November 5th, by the use of 150-pounder shells.

On the 10th the enemy, finding the Pontiac within range, in an endeavor to pick up her anchor that she had previously slipped, she received a rifle-shell which struck her bows,

killing 5 and wounding 7 men; it did serious damage also to the woodwork, and broke a bronze casting connecting the stem to the keel. For the time the vessel was disabled.

Late in November, 1864, General Foster asked navy cooperation "in an attack to assist the movement of General Sherman." For this purpose a force of 500 men was organized and placed under Commander George H. Preble. Four depleted companies of marines formed a part, and two navy howitzers with their complement of men.

On the evening of the 28th, this force at Port Royal was embarked on the Mingoe, Pontiac, and Sonoma, but the fog was too thick to permit a movement. At 4 A.M. it broke away partially, and the vessels got over the shoals into Broad River, the Pontiac ahead, with the only pilot on board, followed by eight other navy vessels. At eight o'clock the admiral found himself at Boyd's Landing, the point designated, twenty miles up the river, with the Pawnee, Mingoe, Pontiac, Sonoma, and Winona. The Wissahickon had grounded below and did not get up. The army transports had not yet arrived, but the transport with General Hatch came in sight very soon, followed by others, and the troops began to debark, as also the naval force before named organized for landing. General Foster arrived at 2 P.M., and army transports continued to arrive with troops and field artillery throughout the day.

The general and the admiral returned in the afternoon, the latter ordering back two or three vessels not required. No advance was made toward the railroad at Grahamsville until the 30th. The enemy had by this time collected in force. General Hatch, who commanded, found "further progress barred by a work which looked upon the road, and was covered on the flanks by heavy woods and other obstructions."

On the 4th of December General Gillmore made a reconnoissance up the Whale Branch to Port Royal Ferry, and the admiral went into the Coosawhatchie River with the Pawnee and Sonoma, where the enemy had placed two guns to bar a passage. The stream was too narrow and winding to get nearer than two thousand yards, and the enemy, after firing a few shots retired to the woods. At the same time, General Hatch pushed out a light column from his right, and the Pontiac sent her boats up the creek from Boyd's Landing, the affair being made to assume the appearance of a demonstration.

The general and the admiral determined to move the force up to Tulifiny Creek with the expressed intention of destroying the railroad above. On the 5th of December (1864), the greater number of the troops and the naval force on shore were embarked, leaving General Hatch with a sufficient force to maintain his position, aided by the gunboat Pontiac. At 8 a.m. of the 6th, the vessels had reached a landing on the right bank of the Tulifiny, but low water prevented landing, except in boats, which was accomplished with as much despatch as possible, and the whole force moved up the single road lying between the river Coosawhatchie and the Tulifiny. The line of railroad, however, was not reached, and if anything was effected by the movement, it was in diverting a force from opposing the march of General Sherman to the sea.

On the 11th the admiral left the Tulifiny, and the following day reported the presence of General Sherman's troops near Savannah. His occupation of that city on the 22d practically ended all naval operations that were not auxiliary to the movements of the army, except that of blockade. Rainy weather held the Union army fast until January 24th. General Sherman was then at Beaufort, S. C., with the right

wing, which some time before had been sent in transports from Savannah. As the rains had ceased, and the roads were passable, he left for Pocotaligo, and the following day demonstrated on Salkahatchie. He requested that the admiral would fire heavy guns high up on the Edisto River, to make the enemy uneasy on that flank, and to develop whether they intended to hold fast both to Charleston and to Columbia.

During January there were constant night demonstrations of the monitors near the forts at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which led the Confederates to believe that it was intended to attempt an entrance. This caused the placing of sixteen torpedoes just without the line of rope obstructions on the afternoon of the 15th of January, and the loss of the monitor Patapsco through exploding one of them a few hours thereafter. She was on the advance picket line, attended by two tugs with several row-boats, dragging for torpedoes. She had drifted up with a strong flood-tide near the line of rope obstructions, and had already steamed out twice before, when in repeating this she struck a torpedo which exploded on the port side, under the fore-body of the The force was sufficiently great to raise the deck, through which the smoke issued. In fifteen seconds the vessel sunk in five fathoms of water, and very near the spot where she had been held on an obstruction for some minutes on April 7, 1863. An officer and sailor on the turret jumped at once to the falls of a boat, and barely succeeded in clearing them before the vessel went down with 62 of the officers This occurred soon after 8 P.M. One man in the and men. windlass-room, the engineer and firemen on watch, and one man, who rushed from the berth-deck through the fire-room, were the only persons who were below and escaped death. Five officers who were on deck at the time, and 38 men escaped, among whom were the Commander, Quackenbush, and Lieutenant William T. Sampson, the executive officer.

The Dai Ching was directed to proceed up the Combahee from St. Helena on January 26th, for the purpose of supporting an army force if required. In the vicinity of Tar Bluff the river is small and crooked, and when a battery opened on her the pilot left the wheel and she ran aground before Chaplin, who commanded, was aware of the fact. The tug Clover, which accompanied her, could not be brought up to get the vessel off, as her captain would not understand or The vessel was defended for seven hours, obey signals. when the carriage of the 100-pounder rifle was disabled by the fire of the enemy. She was then set on fire, the crew landed, and, with the exception of five, escaped to the tug, lying four miles below. Three of the officers and six men were wounded, and sent down in a boat. The armament of the vessel was, one 100-pounder rifle and two small guns.

The Pawnee, Sonoma, and tug Daffodil, lying in the waters of the North Edisto, on the 9th of February engaged three batteries of the enemy, respectively armed with six, four, and two guns. They were situated on Togado Creek, in such manner as to support each other against an attack from gunboats. In the evening the enemy ceased firing; the Pawnee had been struck ten times without serious injury, and the other vessels had received two hits each, without loss of life. Various other engagements occurred about the same time, and until the evacuation of Charleston. Naval forces made attacks of this kind for the purpose of keeping the troops of the enemy from concentrating, and to perplex him as to what were the actual movements of Sherman's army.

In order to aid an army diversion on Bull's Bay, eighteen miles north of Charleston, the admiral despatched, on the

evening of the 11th of February, the Shenandoah, Juniata, Canandaigua, Georgia, Pawnee, Sonoma, Ottawa, Winona, Wando, and Iris to that point. A large number of army transports had arrived also, with troops under the command of General Potter. A preliminary to landing was to find a favorable depth of water and hard ground. It was only on the evening of the 17th that a satisfactory landing-place was found, and 750 men were disembarked under cover of howitzers in launches; the remainder of the force landed the following day, and took up its line of march for Charleston. As on the morning of the 18th that city was found evacuated, it does not seem necessary to note further than the return of the naval vessels and transports to Charleston.

Commander Belknap, in the monitor Canonicus, lying near Moultrie, reported heavy fires in Charleston and on James Island at 1 a.m. (18th), and heavy explosions were heard. At daylight haze and smoke shut out the view. At 8 a.m. he threw two heavy shells into Moultrie, and received no reply; the Confederate flag was, however, flying over it and Castle Pinckney, and the city of Charleston also, but no movement was visible. At this time a magazine blew up in Battery Bee.

The forts had been evacuated the previous night, and an army boat from Morris Island hoisted the flag over Moultrie. About 9 A.M. the Canonicus sent a boat and took possession of a small steamboat, a blockade-runner, under English colors, that had been on shore for several days near Fort Moultrie.

The admiral reports that upon the evacuation of Charleston, he found the ram Columbia, which had been ready for service on January 12th, and grounding coming out of dock, had been seriously strained through lying on uneven bottom. Her length was 209 feet; extreme beam, 49 feet, with a

casemate 65 feet in length pierced for 6 guns, pivoting as before described in the Atlanta, captured in Wassaw Sound in 1863. She had two high-pressure engines, and was plated on the casemate with six inches of iron. A cigar-shaped steamer 160 feet long, supposed to be of sufficient capacity to carry from two hundred and fifty to three hundred bales of cotton, was also found.

Three torpedo boats fitted for service were found sunk in Cooper River. Two were raised, and one of them put in working order. Their length was 64 feet, diameter 5½ feet, and they had a speed of five knots. Six others were under repairs or being completed, and two ready for service.

Higher up in the Cooper River the rams Chicora, Palmetto, and Charleston, had been destroyed and sunk on the evacuation of the city. The fourth, Columbia, has already been described.

After the fall of Charleston, under instructions from the Department, Admiral Dahlgren proceeded to gain information as to the character of the obstructions and defences within Charleston Harbor.

It was asserted by the Secretary of the Navy before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War that the water defences within Charleston harbor had been materially strengthened after the monitor attack of April 7, 1863. This does not seem to be supported by the testimony in Dahlgren's report.

Several persons, whose duties had been to make and plant torpedoes and to make and put down rope obstructions, were examined, and the following facts elicited:

Several months before the spring of 1863 a boom torpedo was placed between battery Bee and Sumter, but it was

¹ Admiral Dahlgren's report.

found to be impracticable, and a continuous rope netting was then tried, which was also swept out of position by the strong tides. The rope obstructions were then cut in lengths of one hundred feet and moored at one end, and three rows of them were then placed so as to swing with the tide, the intervals between them being about one hundred feet, and having about the same distances between the lines. A rope having a diameter of nearly two inches was secured to beer casks tarred, or to pine logs, to serve as floats at distances apart of fifteen feet. Over this rope were secured bights of smaller rope, each end being several fathoms in length. The movement of the water by a propeller, it was supposed, would draw these rope-ends within its influence, and thus foul the propeller.

A row of piles was driven across the middle ground and into the channel, just below Fort Johnson. This was intact in April, 1863, but by the autumn many of the piles had washed out.

In the Hog Island channel a heavy boom obstruction was maintained throughout the war, and several sets of torpedoes on inclined planes beneath the water, the frames resting on the bottom, having usually fifteen torpedoes on each frame.

All of the inferior channels and Cooper River were protected in like manner by torpedoes placed in sets on submarine inclined planes, upon which several of the Confederate vessels had been blown up at various times.

The main channel, leading up close under the guns of Fort Johnson, had three large boiler torpedoes, stated to be in good condition, and having one thousand or more pounds of powder within them. They were on range lines, and intended to be exploded by electricity.

At Fort Johnson and on the wharves of Charleston were a

great many barrel torpedoes fitted for placing in that channel-way and off Charleston with the least possible delay. They were of the same construction as those which had sunk three army transports in St. John's River, the monitor Patapsco off the harbor on January 15th, and the flag-ship Harvest Moon below Georgetown after the fall of Charleston. These barrel torpedoes were held by their moorings some eight feet below the ordinary surface of the water, and were fitted so as to explode on contact.

On the wharf at Charleston was found one of these inclined frames ready for use, with thirty torpedoes fitted for it; they also were constructed to explode by contact.

A boiler torpedo, probably of English fabrication, was found on the wharf ready for charging, together with a large quantity of insulated copper wire protected by a hemp wrapping overlaid with wire.

The torpedoes made for the ironclads, or rams, as they were called, and for the torpedo-boats, were elongated copper cylinders ten inches in diameter, with hemispherical ends, thirty-two inches long, each having several screw sockets for eight fuses so as to present points of explosion widely separated. The charge was one hundred and thirty-four pounds of powder.

Another was of copper, barrel-shaped, tapering to points on the ends; it had sockets for seven fuses on the upper bilge, and contained one hundred and thirty-four pounds of powder.¹

During the autumn of 1863 reconnoitering boats were sent almost nightly, when the weather permitted, into the mouth of Charleston Harbor, and diverse reports were brought to the admiral in respect to the character of the channel ob-

¹ Number 16, Professional Papers, Corps U. S. Engineers, contains full descriptions of these harbor obstructions, etc.

structions. To settle this point as to the main ship channel, a commander on duty proposed making an examination, which met the approval of the admiral. To facilitate this examination General Terry placed a light on Cumming's Point, in order that a fixed point might be known. At midnight Commander Ammen left the New Ironsides in a six-oared boat, and after reaching the vicinity of the obstructions a small grapnel with ten fathoms of line was dragged within and around to the north of Sumter until the light on Cumming's Point was opened well out to the westward of Sum-The boat was then directed outward further from the fort than when entering, and at the turn of the tide the black buoys sustaining one section of the rope obstructions were found in a cluster. This was partially cut away and taken out; the rope was considerably rotted. The admiral was informed as above, and that no difficulty whatever existed in clearing away these rope obstructions just previous to his entering whenever he had a force which he deemed sufficient.

It is well known that a month or so later the Navy Department hoped to send several monitors to strengthen the force off Charleston. On p. 419 of "Memoir of Admiral Dahlgren" is found the following:

"October 22d, 11 A.M. [1863].—I held a council of war in regard to entering the harbor of Charleston when the seven monitors were ready, which would be the second week in November.

"There were eight captains of ironclads and two staff officers. The object was not to have the advice for myself, but to comply with the request of the Secretary, who asked for the opinion of these officers. We began at eleven and finished at five. The four junior officers voted for an attack with seven ironclads. The six seniors were averse. The intelligence was largely with the latter. One of the juniors seemed hardly to know what he was about. So my views were sustained. The majority were for waiting till the reinforcements arrived in December."

The import of an ironclad or, more properly speaking, a monitor attack has not been fully understood by many intelligent persons. Had the absolute destruction of all the vessels entering been assured in the event of failure, and had there remained a sufficient reserve force of any character off the harbor to assure the maintenance of the blockade against the ironclads of the enemy within the harbor, probably every captain at the "Council of War" would have been in favor of entering, but with the chances of some of the vessels grounding, and of others being sunk in shoal water by torpedoes, and afterward raised and employed by the enemy, there was too much danger of losing control of the coast to make it desirable to take the risk. These considerations would naturally be controlling proportionately with the damage that might follow a lack of success in an attack, and would be quite independent of the loss of vessels and of men in making one with reasonable probability of success.

From pages 553 to 593 of "Memoir of Admiral Dahlgren" will be found the text of an official letter of the admiral to the Department, explanatory of the ironelad question in relation to the taking of Charleston. It is dated October 16, 1865, and as we are informed on the preceding page by the editor: "We hold the manuscript in our possession, thus endorsed by the admiral: 'Withdrawn November 8, 1865, the Department objecting to the introduction of Dupont and the opinions of officers, and to those parts where it is assumed, or seems to be so, that the Department did not send vessels enough.—J. A. D."


The editor of the "Memoir," adds: "In other words, the Department was too inimical and revengeful in feeling to Dupont to be just, or to be willing to have him relieved in any measure through any act of theirs, of any possible effect resulting from their continuous displeasure."

The pages preceding the quotations were written before the perusal of the "Memoir." If the reader of this volume labors under the idea that either Admiral Dupont or Admiral Dahlgren should have gone to Charleston or made the attempt, the pages of the "Memoir" may enlighten him.

Bearing in mind that the Department did not think it worth while to give publicity to a letter which it evoked in May, 1863, signed by all of the commanders of ironclads in those waters,1 and that after the Civil War had ended, it had declined to receive an able and perfectly proper letter concerning operations before Charleston during the period of command of its writer, the Department seems to have wished to spare the reading public the doubts and perplexities which the Dutch judge avoided by not listening to the other side of a case. He had heard the one side and declined hearing the other, as he was then perfectly at rest in regard to the merit of the question. If he heard the other side his mind would be filled with perplexity and doubt. The Department had made its statement as to the invulnerability and sufficiency of the monitors to take Charleston, and that was all that the public should require or listen to, even after the war was over; what the commanders of the ironclads wrote about them, and what Admiral Dahlgren had to say about going to Charleston, if given to the public, would only cause doubt and perplexity.

On page 436 of the "Memoir" will be found the following from the diary of Dahlgren: "January 12.—Mail came. . . . Among the letters was one from the Secretary and one from Fox, both prodigiously flattering, and asking for a good character to the monitors." Here is truly "food for reflection."

¹ Captain John Rodgers and Commanders Daniel Ammen, George W. Rodgers, D. M. Fairfax, and John Downes, were the signers, and the letter afterward seen by Captain Drayton and Commander Worden was concurred in by them.



CHAPTER VIII.

HATTERAS INLET-ROANOKE ISLAND.

The reader who has examined the coast charts or maps of the United States is aware that low, long, sandy islets fringe almost the entire coasts of what are known as the Southern States. There are numerous inlets between these islets that have a certain degree of permanency, but many of them close for a series of years, and are found open again after some gale of unusual severity.

Between Cape Henry and Cape Hatteras are several of these ephemeral "inlets" or channels, between the sea and inland waters. Thirteen miles south of Cape Hatteras is Hatteras Inlet, and eighteen miles farther, Ocracoke, the bend of that coast from the cape being west-southwest and, looking toward Cape Henry, north by east.

Hatteras Inlet has more depth over the bar, and its regimen is more permanent than any of the other entrances into the sounds of North Carolina. It was the most convenient entrance for the distribution of supplies to the Confederate army in Virginia, and bordering the inland waters were produced in great abundance what are known as "naval stores." These, and considerable cotton grown in that region, gave ample cargoes for outward bound blockade-running vessels.

No sooner was the Civil War fairly begun, and the Navy Yard at Norfolk in the possession of the Confederates, than heavy guns were transported from that point, and the inlets at Hatteras and Ocracoke fortified.

From the Sounds of Albemarle and Pamlico through Hatteras and Ocracoke Inlets, small vessels made raids to capture vessels under the National flag that might be passing along the coast, and for a time these efforts were well rewarded.

The shoal water extending far out gave these entrances a certain amount of immunity to the raids of privateers and blockade-runners, and it was hoped would prevent a successful attack on the batteries designed to protect these en-Hatteras Inlet has on its bar, at ordinary high water, usually fourteen feet, the depth varying one or two feet more or less from the effects of gales and freshets on the inland waters. Within this outer bar, at a distance of nearly one mile, is what is known as the "bulkhead," a bank of sand separating the deeper waters of the sounds and those within the exterior bar. At ordinary high tide there is a depth of seven feet; when heavy southeast winds bank up the waters, as they do from time to time, nearly double this depth may be found temporarily on the "bulkhead." Once within the outer bar, by means of lighterage, easily effected in smooth water, vessels with cargoes can readily lessen their draught so as to cross the bulkhead; with vessels having batteries and fitted for war purposes, the difficulty of entering is much greater, and where the required depth is eight or nine feet, considerable delay occurs in awaiting the banking up of the waters.

The Navy Department, appreciating the importance of Hatteras Inlet, the principal one affording access to the magnificent sound with its wide ramifications, directed in 1861 the preparation and concentration of such naval force as was available, and invited an army co-operation for its capture.

The military importance of holding Hatteras Inlet was at that time quite unappreciated save by the Navy Department.

The transport steamers were chartered by the navy and commanded by navy officers, and the detachment of troops "was to return to Fort Monroe after the expedition." "It was not intended that you (General Wood) should take any further action in relation to the expedition than to provide such troops for the same as on conference with Commodore Stringham should be found sufficient for the purpose. The expedition originated in the Navy Department, and is under its control."

General Wool, at Fort Monroe, on the 25th of August, 1861, made a detail of 860 men under General B. F. Butler, who was directed to report, as soon as his troops were ready, to Flag-Officer Stringham. "As soon as the object of the expedition is attained, the detachment will return to Fort Monroe."

The following day, the transport steamer Adelaide, Commander Henry S. Stellwagen, and the Peabody, Lieutenant R. R. Lowry, took on board 500 of the 20th Regiment N. Y. Volunteers, Colonel Weber; 220 of the Ninth N. Y. Volunteers, Colonel Hawkins; 100 of the Union Coast Guard, Captain Nixon, and 60 of the 2d U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Larned. With commendable alacrity they left the same day (26th of August) with the flag-ship of Stringham, the steam frigate Minnesota, Captain G. I. Van Brunt; steam frigate Wabash, Captain Samuel Mercer; Monticello, Commander John P. Gillis; Pawnee, Commander S. C. Rowan, and Revenue Cutter Harriet Lane, Captain John Faunce. The army tug Fanny, under the command of Lieutenant Peirce Crosby, of the navy, also accompanied the expedition.

¹ Letter of Assistant Adjutant-General, Rebellion Records, Vol. IV., p. 580.

The transports towed two schooners, having large, unwieldy iron surf-boats on board.

The same afternoon this force rounded Cape Hatteras and anchored off shore near the proposed point of debarkation, which was some three miles east of Hatteras Inlet. Surfboats were hoisted out, and preparations made to facilitate debarkation early in the morning. At daylight on that day Major-General Butler left the flag-ship for the Harriet Lane with the company of marines on that vessel, Captain Shuttleworth, which augmented his command to 915 men.

Signal was made from the flag-ship to disembark troops, and the Pawnee, Monticello, and Harriet Lane to assist the work and cover the landing.

While this was in process of execution, at 8.45 a.m., the Wabash took in tow the sailing frigate Cumberland that had joined the force after arrival off the bar, and followed by the flag-ship Minnesota, led in to attack the batteries known to have been placed for the defence of the inlet.

Soon after, the steam frigate Susquehanna appeared and signal was made her to engage the batteries. The first object of attack was what was afterward known as Fort Clark, situated a half mile east from the principal work at the immediate entrance to the inlet. The vessels had opened fire beyond extreme range and the fort replied.

The Minnesota passed inside and ahead and with her consorts soon caused the battery of five guns, which was without a bomb-proof, to be deserted, the men passing through or around the shallow lagoon, to reach and take shelter in the principal work, which was also on the eastern side of the inlet and known as Fort Hatteras. Shortly after noon it was observed that no flags were flying on either fort, and, as seen from the flag-ship, the nearest work, Clark, was evidently abandoned.

In the meantime the attempt to land had been only partially successful. As the heavy iron surf-boats struck the beach they were thrown high upon it, there to remain, and two flat-boats landing troops were stove. In this manner 315 troops, including 50 United States Artillery, 55 marines, and 2 navy howitzers were thrown on shore without provisions or supplies of any kind, and much of their ammunition was wetted. The surf was heavy and increasing and further attempts to land were discontinued. A movement by the troops was made along the beach toward Fort Clark, and at 2 P.M. the Union flag was hoisted over it by them.

The firing from the fleet had been suspended since 12.30, from the supposition of an intended surrender, as the larger fort was not flying a flag, and was silent.

The Monticello was directed at 4 P.M. to effect an entrance to the inlet, and when well within the breakers Fort Hatteras opened on her and received at once the fire from the Minnesota, Susquehanna, and the Pawnee, which latter vessel had joined in the attack, and soon after was followed by the Harriet Lane with her battery of small rifled guns, effective at the long range then necessary to reach the fort. The Wabash at the time was employed in towing the sailing frigate Cumberland into an offing, as it was supposed the fort had surrendered.

The bombardment continued until sunset, for the most part ineffective, from too great a distance, when the larger vessels hauled off for the night, and the Pawnee, Monticello, and Harriet Lane went up the coast toward the cape and anchored close to the beach for the purpose of protecting the troops, they having withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the forts.

On the following day (28th) at 5.30 A.M. signal was made to prepare for action and follow the motions of the flag-

ship; the weather, which had been threatening, had become pleasant and the sea less rough.

While the heavier vessels led in to attack Fort Hatteras, the Monticello was directed to embark or provision the troops on shore, at the option of General Butler.

The landed troops had during the night thrown up a sand battery, placed their howitzers in it, and had opened on the vessels in the sound in communication with the fort, which seems to have materially disconcerted the enemy.

At 8 A.M. the Susquehanna, leading, opened fire on the fort, the Wabash following; the Minnesota then took position between the two. The vessels anchored, and maintained their fire, and were soon followed by the sailing frigate Cumberland, which anchored also in excellent position and commenced firing with effect. It was soon seen that the pivot guns did the principal part of the work, and this fact became the more apparent as the flag-officer reported "the enemy returned our fire throughout the engagement, but with no effect, their shot falling short," from the fact, doubtless, of not being able to obtain sufficient elevation. Half an hour before the end of the engagement the Harriet Lane, added the fire of her battery. defenders, seeing that the fire from their guns was wholly ineffective, and having suffered considerable loss from the careful firing of the pivot guns in the fleet, hoisted a white flag at 11.10 A.M., when the firing ceased. The fire from the batteries on the ships' broadside had been suspended soon after going into action, the fort being in range only by giving great, if not extreme elevation to the guns. plunging effect of the shells from the heavy pivot guns on the bomb-proof was very great, threatening breaking through; one shell had found its way through a ventilator, and the safety of the magazine was imperilled.

On the appearance of the white flag the troops on the beach marched toward the fort, the army transport and the tug Fanny, with General Butler on board, passed the bar and anchored within the inlet, and the Harriet Lane, in an attempt to do so, grounded, and did not succeed in getting off for some days. Three steamers and several schooners of the enemy that were within the sound watching events, and prepared to throw in reinforcements, left when a shell was thrown at them from the Fanny.

In this engagement not a single casualty occurred to the National forces. In Fort Clark two killed were found, and from Fort Hatteras several killed and a number of wounded were known to have been taken previous to the surrender—13 wounded were among the prisoners.

The guns of the attacking vessels numbered one hundred and fifty-eight; the pivot guns, ten in number, were the most effective, to which may be added the five small rifled guns of the Harriet Lane. The character of the forts and the batteries captured will appear hereafter.

Articles of capitulation were signed between Flag-Officer Stringham and General Butler on the one part, and Samuel Barron, commanding naval force, Colonel Martin, commanding land forces, and Major Andrews, commanding Fort Hatteras: "It is stipulated and agreed by the contracting parties on the part of the United States Government, that the officers and men shall receive the treatment due to prisoners of war." Six hundred and fifteen prisoners were taken, among whom were several who some months before had been officers in the National navy. It is known that a certain number of the garrison escaped previous to the capitulation, some of whom were wounded.

Flag-Officer Barron, in his report to the Confederate Navy Department, states that he arrived at Hatteras Inlet early on the 28th, in the steamer Winslow, accompanied by Colonel Bradford, Chief of Ordnance of North Carolina, and Lieutenants Murdaugh and Sharpe of the Confederate navy. He found Colonel Winslow, in command of Fort Hatteras, very much exhausted from exposure and hard fighting the previous day. He says: "The garrison had hoped for the arrival of a regiment from Newbern the previous night, which would have been employed in an attempted assault of Fort Clark, held by the Union troops, the appearance of bad weather having caused the protecting vessels to seek an offing. Early in the morning the fleet again stood in, took positions and opened fire, and in addition the Union troops had, during the night, erected a battery of rifled field-guns near to Fort Clark, which also opened on us.

"During the first hour, the shells from the ships fell short, the fort only firing occasionally to get range, to reserve the very limited supply of ammunition until the vessels might find it necessary to come nearer in; but they, after some practice, got the exact range of the IX-, X-, and XI-inch guns, and did not find it necessary to alter their positions, while not a shot from our battery reached them with the greatest elevation we could get. . . . Several hours had thus passed, without the ability to damage our adversaries, and just at this time, the magazine being reported to be on fire, a shell having fallen through the ventilator of the bomb-proof into the room adjoining the principal magazine, a white flag was ordered to be shown, when the firing ceased, and the surrender was made."

A very succinct report of General Gatlin, Commander-in-Chief in North Carolina, will be found on p. 573, Vol. IV., of the "Rebellion Records," published by the Government. It concludes as follows: "I may be permitted to conclude this rapid sketch by stating that we failed to make timely efforts to maintain the ascendancy on Pamlico Sound, and thus admitted Burnside's fleet without a contest; we failed to put a proper force on Roanoke Island, and thus lost the key to our interior coast; and we failed to furnish General Branch with a reasonable force, and thus lost the important town of Newbern."

On consultation with Flag-Officer Stringham and Commander Stellwagen, General Butler determined to leave the troops and hold the fort until he could get some further instructions from the Government.

He adds: "The importance of the point cannot be overrated. When the channel is buoyed out any vessel may carry fifteen feet of water over it with ease. Once inside, there is a safe harbor and anchorage in all weathers. From there the whole coast of Virginia and North Carolina, from Norfolk to Cape Lookout, is within our reach by lightdraught vessels, which cannot possibly live at sea during the winter months. From it offensive operations may be made upon the whole coast of North Carolina to Bogue Inlet, extending many miles inland to Washington, Newbern, and Beaufort. In the language of the chief-engineer of the rebels, Colonel Thompson, in an official report, 'it is the key of the Albemarle.' In my judgment, it is a station second in importance only to Fortress Monroe on this coast. As a depot for coaling and supplies for the blockading squadron it is invaluable. As a harbor for our coasting trade, or inlet from the winter storms or from pirates, it is of the first importance." Future events fully confirmed the opinion of General Butler as to the value of Hatteras Inlet in a military point of view, and no less in respect to all of the advantages so clearly expressed.

Twenty-five pieces of artillery, one thousand stand of arms, a large quantity of ordnance stores, provisions, three valuable prizes, two light-boats, and four stands of colors were captured.

From the 25th of June to the capture of Hatteras Inlet, on the 28th of August, one bark, seven brigs, and eight schooners had been captured by "privateers" or Confederate cruisers, and had been brought into the inlet.

The flag-ship proceeded to New York on the 30th with the prisoners on board; the Pawnee and Monticello remained at the inlet, the remainder of the vessels proceeded to different points of blockade, the company of regulars returned to Fortress Monroe, and the other troops remained as a garrison until further orders. Hatteras Inlet became a depot of supplies for coal and the other wants of vessels blockading, and in the coming months a centre of operations. As soon as necessary surroundings were satisfactorily arranged, Commander Rowan, of the Pawnee, became active.

On the 16th of September he sent Lieutenant Maxwell to the fort commanding Ocracoke Inlet, situated on Beacon Island, some twenty miles distant. He was in command of the army tug Fanny, and carried 61 men belonging to what was known as the naval brigade, commanded by Colonel Hawkins.

The launch of the Pawnee was in tow, manned by 22 sailors and 6 marines, armed with a 12-pounder howitzer, commanded by Lieutenant Eastman. The fort was situated on the sea face of Beacon Island, and was found deserted. It was octagonal, having in the centre a bomb-proof one hundred feet square, with the magazine within, and four large water-tanks directly over it. Twenty platforms for guns were partially destroyed by fire; the guncarriages had been burned, four VIII-inch navy shell-guns, and fourteen heavy 32-pounders were found; two guns had been carried away the previous day. The men were landed



JOSIAH TATNALL.

without delay, the trunnions of the guns broken off, and at the same time the launch went to the town of Portsmouth near by, where three VIII-inch navy guns were found lying on the beach and one mounted on its carriage. The attempt to make a battery had been abandoned in consequence of the taking of the forts at Hatteras Inlet. The town, which had some five hundred inhabitants before the attack on the Hatteras Inlet forts, was nearly deserted; those remaining said they were Union men, and expressed their gratification at seeing their old flag again. "Lieutenant Eastman assured them that they would not be molested by the Government, and that they might return to their usual occupations." He then destroyed the guns and returned to the The combustible material had been placed within and around the bomb-proof of Fort Ocracoke, which was supported by heavy pine timbers and logs. It was destroyed by fire, after which the expedition returned to the Pawnee.

Either with or without competent authority, soon after the occupation of Hatteras Inlet, the Twentieth Regiment of Indiana volunteers, Colonel Brown, was sent to occupy Chicamicomico, near the northern end of Hatteras Island, some twenty-five miles north of the lighthouse. Within this sandspit the water is quite shoal for two miles or more, and this speedily led to the capture of the army tug Fanny, and a considerable quantity of army stores.

The proximity of Roanoke Island and the presence of a large number of Confederate troops fortifying it, made the bait of a regiment too tempting to be resisted, so on the 4th of October there appeared ten transports and seven steamers, including the captured tug Fanny, a cotton barge, and two flat-boats laden with troops. A part of this force was landed north of the Indiana regiment, and the remainder was taken south to cut off the retreat.

The troops retreated in haste, and favored by the delay of the enemy in getting his forces on shore from the shoal water extending so far out, all save twenty or more stragglers had passed the point of debarkation when it had been effected. The retreat was continued to Hatteras lighthouse, the Confederates pursuing to within a short distance of it. Here the Union troops were reinforced by a regiment from Hatteras Inlet, and here was also found the steam frigate Susquehanna as close to the shore as moderately bold water would allow. The retreat had been hasty and laborious, and the troops were greatly in want of food and water; their necessities were soon relieved, and when the morning dawned the Confederates took up their line of retreat to some point where a comparatively near approach to the long sand spit upon which they were would enable them to re-embark. The Monticello, commanded by Lieutenant D. L. Braine, arrived at the lighthouse on the sea face, and was directed to pursue the enemy in retreat. At 1.30 P.M. of the 5th she came up with a considerable force at Kinekeet, moving north with many stragglers in the rear; two small Confederate steamers were in the inland waters, following as near the island as the depth of the water would allow. A heavy fire of shells from three guns on board of the Monticello was maintained with great effect, which caused the men to scatter in haste to a clump of trees, beyond which, in the sound, were several of their steamers, upon which the fugitives were taking refuge by means of boats. The Monticello continued her firing for two hours, when two men were discovered on the beach making signals; a boat was sent near the beach. and one man belonging to the Twentieth Indiana was rescued; the other was unfortunately drowned in the surf.

The Monticello was in three fathoms, as near the beach as the roughness of the water would permit, and guided by the information obtained, resumed throwing shells, which was continued until near sunset—nearly four hours—with little intermission.

Commander O. S. Glisson, in the Mount Vernon, sent two armed boats on the night of December 31, 1861, to destroy a lightship formerly anchored on Frying Pan Shoal, and then secured under the guns of Fort Caswell. No one was found on board of the vessel; she had been fitted for the reception of eight guns, to aid, it was supposed, in harbor defence. The combustible material found on board, saturated with the turpentine brought for the purpose, soon made a blaze sufficient to attract the attention of the men in the fort, whose cry of alarm was heard by the boats' crews. The fort opened fire soon after in the supposed direction of retreat of the boats. The lightboat was speedily burned.

The reader is reminded of the magnitude of the struggle in progress and of its geographical extent on land and sea. Considering the waters only, the Potomac River and the water within the Capes of Virginia presented no inconsiderable field of operations; then again, as soon after the capture of Hatteras Inlet as a force could be got together, followed a much larger expedition for the capture of Port Royal and further operations east of Cape Florida. The coasts bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and upper waters of the Mississippi were no less theatres of armed contention.

Important as was the possession of Hatteras Inlet, it need not be a subject of wonder that nothing further grew out of it for the time. The Confederates set to work with earnestness with their limited means, after the capture of the inlet, to fortify Roanoke Island, which was still a key to the greater part of the inland waters, but even after a lapse of intervening months, when the preparations of the co-operative Union

forces had been completed and were within Hatteras Inlet, they had not yet perfected their defences.

On that coast of storms in winter, neither the "vessels of war," as they were somewhat inaptly termed, if compared with vessels built for the purpose, nor the transports for the troops, often unseaworthy, stood on the order of their coming. Happily for them, Hampton Roads was only one hundred and fifty miles distant, but on arriving off the inlet vessels that had been chartered not to draw more than twelve feet were found of heavier draught, and some of them hammered to pieces on the bar, and many of the naval vessels were of extreme draught for crossing the bulkhead. They came as they could, crossed the bar into the inlet as soon as possible, then awaited exceptional banking of the waters to cross the "bulkhead."

Rear-Admiral L. M. Goldsborough, who was in command of the naval forces, and General A. E. Burnside, who commanded the troops, arrived on January 13th. Owing, however, to a lack of water for days before, few or none of the vessels had crossed the bulkhead; on the 15th, however, the naval vessels, having least draught in general, began crossing, and by the 23d all of them that had arrived up to that time were over the bulkhead. The Whitehall, in getting across the outer bar, or within the inlet from the sea, was so injured that she had to be sent to Hampton Roads for repairs.

Not before the 22d of January had General Burnside made any considerable progress in getting the army transports over the bulkhead, and from the facts above stated, the last naval vessel was delayed until the 28th of January, and the last of the army transports until February 5th. For the time being, the river steamer Philadelphia was the flag-ship of Rear-Admiral Goldsborough; the naval vessels intended

for action were as follows: Stars and Stripes, Lieutenant-Commanding Reed Werden, and flag-ship of Commander S. C. Rowan; Louisiana, Lieutenant-Commanding A. Murray; Hetzel, Lieutenant-Commanding H. K. Davenport; Underwriter. Lieutenant-Commanding Wm. N. Jeffers; Delaware, Lieutenant-Commanding S. P. Quackenbush; Commodore Perry, Lieutenant-Commanding C. W. Flusser; Valley City. Lieutenant-Commanding J. C. Chaplin: Commodore Barney, Acting-Lieutenant R. T. Renshaw; Hunchback, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant-Commanding E. R. Colhoun; Southfield, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant-Commanding C. F. W. Behm; Morse, Acting-Master Peter Hayes; Whitehead, Acting-Master Chas. A. French; Lockwood, Acting-Master G. W. Graves; Brincker, Acting-Master, John E. Giddings; I. N. Seymour, Acting-Master F. S. Wells; Ceres, Acting-Master John McDiarmid; Putnam, Acting-Master W. J. Hotchkiss; Shawsheen, Acting-Master Thos. G. Woodward, and Granite, Acting-Master's Mate E. Boomer.

The army transports were forty-six in number, armed with forty-seven guns of small calibre, and carried in round numbers 12,000 troops. They formed not an inconsiderable part of the attacking force, and were under Commander Samuel F. Hazard, U.S.N.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough reports, February 18th: "During our detention at the inlet we resorted to every means in our power to get accurate information of the enemy's position and preparations, and we obtained enough to enable us to arrange our programme of attack, which, in substance, was as follows: The naval division was to lead from the time of starting up to that of encountering the enemy.

"Early on the morning of the 5th, the necessary general signals for a move were thrown out from the Philadelphia, and as soon afterward as could be expected for so large a number of vessels, all were under way, with the naval division as prescribed, arranged in three columns, commanded respectively by Lieutenants-Commanding Werden, Murray, and Davenport. Although the weather favored us, our progress was unavoidably slow."

At sundown the vessels arrived and anchored in line off Stumpy Point, within ten miles of the marshes. "A certain individual" was sent for, who lived near by, whose services were deemed important, and he was brought on board of the flag-ship Philadelphia. The following morning, Flag-Officer Goldsborough, with his staff, consisting of Commander Case, Captain's Clerk Fisher, as signal officer, and Lieutenants T. R. Robeson and N. S. Barstow went on board of the Southfield, which for the time became the flag-ship. The vessels were again under way with two light-draught steamers, Ceres and Putnam, a mile or so in advance. About 9 A.M. the weather, which had been thick, partially cleared, and the vessels of the enemy were seen at anchor, apparently close in with the shore, between Pork and Wier Points. At 10.30, when within a couple of miles of the marshes, it became thick, rainy, and windy, and the vessels again anchored in In the afternoon, one of the steamers of the enemy approached the marshes for the purpose of reconnoitring. and was not molested, as the flag-officer "was not unwilling that she should accomplish her wishes."


The day following, February 7th, gave evident signs of good weather. At nine, general signal was made to get under way. The Underwriter was also put in advance as a lookout, the Ceres and Putnam to keep only one-fourth of a mile in advance of the flag-ship. The channel through the marshes is so narrow as not to admit of more than two vessels abreast, and that was the order of steaming until the much wider waters of Croatan Sound were reached. The

vessels having IX-inch guns were then "closed up around the flag-ship." At 10.30, eight vessels of the enemy were seen drawn up behind an extensive obstruction formed by a double row of piles and sunken vessels stretching well across the sound and between the forts on Pork and Wier Points. One of them fired a heavy gun, to announce, perhaps, the impending attack. In less than an hour, the Underwriter, in advance, having shelled Sandy Point, made signal that it was not fortified. This omission on the part of the enemy favored the landing of troops at Ashby's Harbor, as arranged.

Not long after this announcement the naval division, commanded as above given, accompanied as previously arranged by the army division, composed of the Picket, Captain T. P. Ives; Huzzar, Captain F. Crocker; Pioneer, Captain C. E. Baker; Vidette, Captain I. L. Foster; Ranger, Captain S. Emerson; Lancer, Captain M. B. Morley, and Chasseur, Captain John West, in close order, had approached sufficiently near the enemy to attack, and to employ their heaviest fire against the battery on Pork Point, a battery between Pork and Wier Points, and another on Redstone Point, all of which had opened fire on the advancing vessels. At noon the action became general; at 1.30 the barracks behind Pork Point had been set on fire by shells and burned furiously for an hour. At this time the vessels were hotly engaged.

Toward 3 P.M. the troops, embarked on board of light-draught steamers and boats, started to land at Ashby's Harbor. It was guarded by a large body of the enemy's troops, with a field battery, but the Delaware, with the division flag of Commander S. C. Rowan, having very judiciously taken up a flanking position to the southward of Pork Point, opportunely turned her guns on the enemy, enfilading Ashby's Harbor and scattered the troops with IX-inch shrapnel.

At 4.30, Pork Point battery and the one next to the northward ceased firing for a time, and five of the enemy's steamers, apparently injured, went behind Wier's Point, and the troops landed. At 5 p.m., the batteries and the enemy's



Roanoke Island.

steamers again opened fire. In forty minutes these vessels were compelled to retire; one of them in a disabled condition took refuge under Redstone battery. At six, only Pork Point battery was active, and to avoid wasting shells, signal was made to cease firing. In the course of the afternoon

Midshipman B. J. Porter landed with six navy howitzers, "to assist the army in commanding the main road and its two forks during the night, and to assist in more active operations the following morning."

The direction from which the rattle of musketry on the land proceeded gave assurance that the Union troops were not in the line of fire, and the gunboats were again moved up and engaged the forts. This continued until the firing of small arms slackened, and then signal was made to cease firing, as it was supposed that the Union troops were approaching the rear of the batteries. At that time, however, the enemy were replying with only one gun.

At 1 P.M. the Underwriter, Valley City, Seymour, Lockwood, Ceres, Shawsheen, Putnam, Whitehead, and Brincker, were ordered to clear away the double line of piling, which was effected soon after 4 P.M. About the time our vessels had removed the obstructions, the National flag had been hoisted by the Union troops, and a few minutes later the enemy had set on fire the works at Redstone, and the steamer Curlew. Both blew up in the early part of the evening, and Roanoke Island was then in the undisputed possession of the National troops.

Pork Point batteries, known to the Confederates as Fort Bartow, was found to be a heptagon, mounting eight 32-pounders and one 68-pounder rifled gun. In its rear was a field battery of three guns, designed to protect it against the advance of troops. The six howitzers from the fleet under Midshipman Porter rendered essential service in the reduction of this work. A mile and a half north of Fort Bartow was Fort Blanchard, mounting four 32-pounders, and one mile beyond that Fort Huger, on Wier's Point, mounting two 68-pounder rifles and ten 32-pounders. Fort Ellis, on the eastern side of the island, was a four-gun battery, in-

tended to prevent the debarkation of troops. On the mainland, nearly opposite Fort Bartow (Pork Point), was Fort Forrest. This was placed on hulks sunk in the sand, and to enfilade vessels that might attempt to remove the double row of piles beyond which the eight Confederate vessels were placed. It was stated in a post return, made ten days previous to the attack, that the defence for Roanoke Island was forty 32-pounders, seven rifled guns, and five days' ammunition

The naval casualties, including the howitzer battery of six guns operating with the army, were 6 killed, 17 wounded, and 2 missing.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough speaks in terms of great commendation of all under his command, and especially of officers commanding vessels. He adds, "It is really difficult for me to state in adequate terms how largely I feel indebted to Commanders Rowan and Case for their constant and signal services throughout, from the very inception to the consummation of the achievement in view."

This victory was most important; the proximate result left no ports or inlets unoccupied by our forces along the entire North Carolina coast except Wilmington. Including what was soon after achieved by Flag-Officer Dupont, on the coast of Georgia and Florida, Charleston and Wilmington were the only entrances unclosed from Cape Henry to Cape Florida.

With untiring labor and zeal we find that at 3 P.M. of the day following the surrender of the Confederate forts, Commander Rowan had taken on board all of the ammunition

¹ The army followed the scattered forces of the Confederates, and on the northern part of the island received the surrender of a considerable number, making a total of 2,677, including the wounded. A considerable number had effected their escape at Nag's Head. The army loss was 41 killed, and 181 wounded. The loss of the enemy was considerably less, as he was well protected.

obtainable, which was only twenty rounds per gun, and had entered Albemarle Sound for the purpose of destroying the seven Confederate war vessels that had escaped after the fall of Roanoke Island. His pennant was on board the Delaware, Commander Quackenbush, and was followed by the Louisiana, Hetzel, Underwriter, Commodore Perry, Valley City, Morse, Seymour, Whitehead, Lockwood, Ceres, Shawsheen, Brincker, and Putnam.

As this force passed into the sound the smoke of the two Confederate steamers was seen on the further shore, apparently heading for the Pasquotank River. Signal was made to chase, and the course changed to cut them off if possible, but without success. The flotilla steamed up the Pasquotank to within ten miles of Fort Cobb, where it anchored at 8 p.m.

The officers commanding vessels were assembled on board of the flag-ship and informed by Commander Rowan that the vessels of the enemy would be found either drawn up behind the Cobb Point battery, or they had escaped through the canal to Norfolk. "Calling their attention to the fact that there were only twenty rounds of ammunition per gun, the vessels would be organized for a reconnoissance in force, to be converted into an attack if it was deemed prudent. No firing would be admissible until the order was given, and in order further to economize ammunition, each vessel as she approached the enemy should run him down and engage hand-to-hand. With this understanding these noble spirits returned to their respective ships to await the events of the morrow."

At daylight of the 10th, the flotilla weighed anchor and formed in the order prescribed, the Underwriter, Perry,

¹ Commander Rowan's Report.

Morse, and Delaware in advance, with the Ceres on their right flank. The remainder of the force, led in order by the Louisiana, and the Hetzel, Valley City, and Whitehead being ordered, if the attack was made, to leave the line as soon as the battery was passed, and attack it in reverse. The flotilla proceeded at moderate speed up the river.

At 8.30 the enemy's steamers were seen drawn up, as anticipated, behind the battery, which mounted four heavy 32-pounders, and was commanded by Commodore Lynch in person, and supported by the schooner Black Warrior, moored on the opposite shore, armed with two guns of the same class. The vessels of the enemy were drawn up on a diagonal line, the right resting on the Cobb Point battery. When within long range, battery and vessels opened fire with 80-pounder rifle and other guns; when within threequarters of a mile signal was made, "Dash at the enemy," and fire was opened by the flotilla with telling effect. quite demoralized the enemy; the Black Warrior was set on fire and abandoned; the fort was abandoned when the head of the column passed it, and the vessels designated dashed at the vessels of the enemy. The Perry, under command of Flusser, struck the flag-ship Sea Bird and sunk her, and took the officers and crew prisoners; the Underwriter cut off the retreat of the Beaufort, and the Ceres ran ahead and took possession of the Ellis, whose crew deserted and endeavored to escape to the shore; the Delaware boarded the Fanny, that had been set on fire and deserted by the enemy. His defeat was sudden and overwhelming. "Three or four of the flotilla proceeded at once to Elizabeth City and ran alongside of the wharves. A battery of field artillery fled from the principal street. An armed party from the flotilla came suddenly on a mounted officer of the 'Wise Legion,' who, in obedience to orders from General Henningsen, was compelling the defenceless people to set fire to the houses." Several were set on fire before he was arrested and brought to Commander Rowan. A curious incident, truly, in war, when the enemy becomes the protector against the senseless injuries inflicted by pretended friends.

The armed men were recalled to their respective vessels. "No other houses were destroyed besides those set on fire under the direction of Lieutenant Scroggs of the Wise Legion." 1

The Confederate steamer Forrest, which had been disabled in the engagement at Roanoke Island on the 7th, a gunboat on the stocks, and another vessel with lighter frame had been set on fire at the shipyard by the enemy. Competent persons were sent on shore to destroy boilers and machinery and ways; this done, the vessels withdrew to Cobb's Point. Unsuccessful efforts had been made by other vessels of the flotilla to extinguish the fires on board of the Fanny and the Black Warrior. The latter vessel had on board a large amount of provisions and stores for the Confederate vessels, all of which were burned. The machinery of the Fanny and Sea Bird was destroyed and the armament of those vessels was in part recovered. The fort at Cobb's Point was destroyed, after removing powder, powder tanks, and projectiles, and some of the vessels were then despatched to further thwart the designs of the enemy. Nothing more brilliant in naval "dash" occurred during the entire civil war than appears in this attack.

Lieutenant-Commanding Murray, in the Louisiana, accompanied by the Underwriter, the Perry, and the Lockwood, went to Edenton on the 12th. After a reconnoissance of the entrance, the smallest vessel in advance passed up to the

¹ Rowan's Report.

town. A company of mounted artillery precipitately fled and many of the inhabitants had left the town. Eight cannon and one schooner were destroyed.

The vessels were visited by the town authorities and other persons "who professed sentiments of loyalty to the Union."

Lieutenant-Commanding Jeffers proceeded on the 13th, in the Lockwood, accompanied by the Shawsheen and Whitehead, with two schooners in tow, to the mouth of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal. Two small steamers and three small schooners were about a mile and a quarter distant, and the entrance was obstructed. A picket stationed near fired to give the alarm, and a large body of men got under cover.

From a point near the entrance to the canal, three shells were thrown by the vessels, when the whole body of the enemy fled. A sunken schooner, supported by piles and logs, was found fifty yards within the canal, which formed a complete barrier. A body of fifteen armed men were thrown out, and at the distance of half a mile a second row of piles was found obstructing the canal. A fine dredging-machine that had been in use sunk at that moment. The enemy had destroyed the machinery and set the upper works on fire. The two schooners in tow were then sunk in the mouth of the canal, supplementing as it were the work already done by the enemy.

Commander Rowan, in the Delaware, returned to Elizabeth City at five P.M. of the 18th, and ordered the Louisiana, Perry, Morse, Lockwood, and Whitehead to follow. Going up Croatan Sound, he found the Barney at anchor as prearranged; another vessel, the Hunchback, with a battalion of the Ninth New York on board, had grounded; the remainder of the regiment was on board of the Barney.

The vessels anchored to await the arrival of the Hunch-

back. On the morning of the 19th the gunboats moved to the head of the sound, and Lieutenant-Commanding Murray was sent in the Lockwood to make a reconnoissance of Plymouth. In the meantime the Hunchback with the remainder of the troops came up and anchored. Leaving the force off the mouth of the Roanoke to await Murray's return in the Lockwood, with the Delaware and Perry, Rowan proceeded to Winton "for the purpose of communicating with the Union men said to be in arms at that place."

On the return of Murray the vessels awaiting him followed Rowan. Being desirous to reach Winton at an early hour the Delaware and Perry proceeded at full speed. At 4 P.M they came in sight of the wharf and houses at the landing; the town itself was hidden by a high bluff covered with oak trees.

"Ranging up past the wharf and bluff, where a negro woman stood, apparently to assure us that no danger need be apprehended, suddenly a small armed force and two batteries of light artillery opened a heavy fire on the vessels." The artillery overshot their mark; the Delaware was too near to bring her battery to bear, and was obliged to steam ahead. She turned with some difficulty in the narrow channel, and opened fire on the enemy; the Perry from a position more favorable opened at once with shrapnel. The vessels moved down the river some seven miles and anchored to await the arrival of the expected reinforcement.

At early daylight on the 20th the flotilla moved up to Winton, the leading vessels throwing a few shrapnel on shore to cover the landing of the troops, which was speedily effected. In a few minutes Colonel Hawkins's force, accompanied by two navy howitzers, had possession of the bluff and passed over to the town without opposition. A quantity of military stores, tents, arms and knapsacks, and the

quarters occupied by the troops of the enemy were destroyed. The troops were re-embarked, and the force withdrew to the sound. The Perry and Whitehead were despatched to watch Elizabeth City.

The sounds were patroled by the flotilla until the army had made its preparations and the vessels had received an abundant supply of ammunition, indispensable stores for the work before them.